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Abstract
This paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a diﬀeren-
tiated duopoly (with imperfect substitutes), total wage bill maximiz-
ing unions and labour decreasing returns. It is shown that the stan-
dard result, that equilibrium proﬁts are always higher under Cournot,
may be reversed even for a fairly low degree of product diﬀerentiation.
Moreover, the presence of labour decreasing returns tends to reinforce
the mechanisms that contribute to the reversal result, making this
event possible for a wider range of situations, with respect to those
identiﬁed by the earlier literature.
Keywords: Cournot-Bertrand proﬁt diﬀerential, unions, labour decreas-
ing returns
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1 Introduction
A cornerstone result in duopoly theory is that, when goods are imperfect
substitutes, ﬁrms’ proﬁts are higher under competition ` a la Cournot than ` a la
∗E-mail adresses: lfanti@ec.unipi.it (Fanti) and meccheri@ec.unipi.it (Meccheri)
1Bertrand. Singh and Vives (1984) ﬁrst showed such result by developing the
Dixit’s (1979) diﬀerentiated duopoly model with linear demand structure and
exogenous (constant) marginal costs.1 More recently, the robustness of this
classic result has been investigated by introducing, in the same framework of
Singh and Vives (1984), a two-stage game. While in the second stage ﬁrms
compete in the product market, in the ﬁrst stage either sole duopolists or
duopolists together with an upstream agent make choices that aﬀect their
production costs. In particular, Qiu (1997) analyzes the case in which, prior
to the standard product market game, each duopolist chooses a level of cost-
reducing research and development (R&D) investment and shows that the
relative eﬃciency of Cournot and Bertrand competition depends on three
factors: R&D productivity, the extent of spillovers and the degree of product
market diﬀerentiation. Correa-L´ opez and Naylor (2004), instead, introduce
upstream “suppliers” in the form of unions and consider a decentralized wage-
bargaining game played between each ﬁrm and a ﬁrm-speciﬁc labour union.
In this context, they ﬁnd that, if unions are suﬃciently powerful and care
enough about wages, the standard result (i.e. ﬁrms’ proﬁts are higher under
Cournot competition) may be reversed.
The aim of this paper is to address the issue of whether the standard re-
sult concerning the dominance of Cournot over Bertrand equilibrium proﬁts
remains valid with unions and labour decreasing returns. Hereof, it relates
more closely to Correa-L´ opez and Naylor (2004), but with an important
departure. In particular, while Correa-L´ opez and Naylor (2004), following
the previous literature on diﬀerentiated duopoly, consider labour constant
returns (or, in other words, constant marginal costs), we introduce labour
decreasing returns, which also imply increasing marginal costs, into the anal-
ysis. Indeed, although the latter feature as the most common hypothesis in
microeconomic modelling (at least, with reference to the short-run), the ef-
fects that they produce in a duopolistic framework have not been previously
investigated by the literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the
basic model, in which two ﬁrms compete in the product market by producing
diﬀerentiated goods. Under Cournot and Bertrand competition, we derive
1With Singh and Vives’s (1984, p. 456) words, “[...] proﬁts are larger, equal, or smaller
in Cournot than in Bertrand competition, according to whether the goods are substitutes,
independent, or complements”. See also, among others, Vives (1985), Cheng (1985) and
Okuguchi (1987).
2equilibrium values for the key variables of interest. In Section 3, we compare
Cournot and Bertrand equilibrium proﬁts. Finally, Section 4 concludes, while
in the Appendix the proof of a result is provided.
2 Model
Following Singh and Vives (1984) and, subsequently, Qiu (1997) and Correa-
L´ opez and Naylor (2004) (CL&N), among others, we consider a model of
diﬀerentiated product market duopoly, in which each ﬁrm sets its output,
given pre-determined wages, to maximize proﬁts. Preferences of the repre-
sentative consumer are given by:
U(qi,qj) = α(qi + qj) −
(q2




where qi and qj are outputs by ﬁrm i and j, respectively, α > 0 and
γ ∈ (0,1) denotes the extent of product diﬀerentiation, with goods assumed
to be imperfect substitutes. The derived product market demand is linear
and, with reference to the representative ﬁrm i, is given by:
pi(qi,qj) = α − γqj − qi. (2)
Let assume that only labour input is used for production. As already dis-
cussed in the Introduction, another literature’s standard assumption is that
labour exhibits constant returns, which implies ﬁrms face constant marginal
costs. In this paper, instead, we modify such hypothesis by introducing





where li = q2
i represents the number of workers employed by the ﬁrm i to
produce qi output units of variety i. The choice of such speciﬁc technology,
described by the functional form of Eq. (3), allows for analytical results and
also implies that ﬁrms have quadratic costs, which is a typical example of
increasing costs.
Hence, the ﬁrm i’s proﬁt can be written as:
πi = piqi − wili = piqi − wiq
2
i (4)
3where wi is the per-worker wage paid by ﬁrm i, with wi < α.
Following the established literature on unionized oligopolies (e.g. Horn
and Wolinsky, 1988; Dowrick, 1989; Naylor, 1999; CL&N), production costs
(i.e. wages) are no longer assumed to be as exogenously given for ﬁrms, but
they are the outcome of a strategic game previously played between each ﬁrm
and a labour union. In this paper, we consider the case in which ﬁrms’ wages
are ﬁxed by (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) “monopolistic” unions, which are rent-maximizing
(e.g. Sørensen, 1992). As well-known (e.g. Pencavel, 1985; Oswald, 1985;
Dowrick and Spencer, 1994), this is consistent with the case of an union that
can costlessly redistribute income among its members. Technically speaking,
in this context, each union’s utility function is given by Vi = (wi−w)li, where
w is the reservation wage (e.g. the wage that applies in a competitive labour
market). Also note that the total rent Vi equals the total wage bill if w = 0.
Since assuming w = 0 does not produce any qualitative changes in our ﬁnal
results, for algebraic simplicity, from here onwards we will concentrate on
the case of “total wage bill maximizing” unions, more speciﬁcally.2 Hence,





In what follows, we will study, according to the diﬀerent types of product
market competition, two diﬀerent two-stage games. In stage 1, due to the
fact that both ﬁrms are unionized, unions’ choices take place simultaneously
across ﬁrms, with each union taking the wage of the other ﬁrm as given.
In stage 2, by playing a non-cooperative oligopolistic game (which could be
either Cournot-type or Bertrand-type), ﬁrms choose their levels of output
and (given the technology) factor input, taking wages as determined in the
prior stage. We proceed by backward induction beginning with the Cournot
case.
2As well known, wage and employment choices in the presence of unionisation may be
modelled according to diﬀerent ways. In this regard, we have chosen to adopt a relatively
simple structure because our aim is that to provide a ﬁrst analysis of the eﬀects that labour
decreasing returns produce in the study framework. Extensions to other hypotheses are
left for future research.
42.1 Cournot equilibrium under labour decreasing re-
turns
Taking Eqs. (2) and (4) into account, proﬁt-maximization under Cournot





As γ > 0, the best-reply functions are downward-sloping, that is, under
the Cournot assumption, the product market game is played in strategic
substitutes. From Eq. (6), and its equivalent for ﬁrm j, we can obtain, for
given wi and wj, the ﬁrm i’s output as:
qi(wi,wj) =
α[2(wj + 1) − γ]
4(wi + 1)(wj + 1) − γ2 (7)
and, by substituting Eq. (7) in Eq. (4), the ﬁrm i’s proﬁt as:
πi(wi,wj) =
α2(wi + 1)[γ − 2(wj + 1)]2
[4(1 + wi)(1 + wj) − γ2]
2 . (8)
By substituting Eq. (7) in Eq. (5) and maximizing with respect to wi,
we get also the following expression, which deﬁnes (for the union-ﬁrm pair i)
the sub-game perfect best-reply function in relation to the wage, under the
assumption of a non-cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the product
market:
wi(wj) =
4(wj + 1) − γ2
4(wj + 1)
. (9)
In symmetric sub-game perfect equilibrium, wi = wj = w and hence,







where the apex C recalls that it is obtained under Cournot competition
in the product market.
Finally, the sub-game perfect equilibrium quantity (after substitution of
Eq. (10) in Eq. (7)) and proﬁt (after substitution of Eq. (10) in Eq. (8))
under Cournot competition are given by, respectively:
5qi = qj = q
C =
α
2 + γ +
p
4 − γ2 (11)














2.2 Bertrand equilibrium under labour decreasing re-
turns
We consider now the case in which the product market game is characterized
by price-setting behaviour by ﬁrms, i.e. competition occurs ` a la Bertrand.
From Eq. (2) and its counterpart for the ﬁrm j, we can write product demand
for the ﬁrm i as:
qi(pi,pj) =
α(1 − γ) − pi + γpj
1 − γ2 (13)
hence, using Eq. (4), the ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is given by:
πi(pi,pj) = pi
￿









From Eq. (14), the ﬁrst-order condition for proﬁt-maximization gives the
ﬁrm’s i price choice, as a function of the price chosen by ﬁrm j, as:
pi(pj) =
[α(1 − γ) + γpj](2wi + 1 − γ2)
2(wi + 1 − γ2)
(15)
thus, for γ > 0, the Bertrand product market game is played in strategic
complements. By substituting in Eq. (15) the corresponding equation for
the ﬁrm j and solving for pi, we get the Bertrand equlibrium price for given
wages, wi and wj:
pi(wi,wj) =
α(2wi + 1 − γ2)[2(wj + 1) − γ(1 + γ)]
4(wi + 1)(wj + 1) − γ2 [2(wi + wj) + 5 − γ2]
. (16)
Hence, by substituting in Eq. (13), we get the sub-game perfect output
as a function of wages, which are ﬁxed by unions in the ﬁrst stage of the
game, as:
6qi(wi,wj) =
α[2(wj + 1) − γ(1 + γ)]
4(wi + 1)(wj + 1) − γ2 [2(wi + wj) + 5 − γ2]
(17)
and, by using Eqs. (17), (16) and (4), the ﬁrm i’s proﬁt as:
πi(wi,wj) =
α2[2(wj + 1) − γ(1 + γ)]
2 (wi + 1 − γ2)
[4(wi + 1)(wj + 1) − γ2 [2(wi + wj) + 5 − γ2]]
2. (18)
Also in the Bertrand competition case, the union’s utility function is given
by Eq. (5). Hence, by substituting Eq. (17) in Eq. (5), and maximizing
with respect to wi, we get the following expression:
wi(wj) =
4(wj + 1) + γ2 [γ2 − (2wj + 5)]
2[2(wj + 1) − γ2]
(19)
which deﬁnes, analogously to Eq. (9) of the Cournot case, the best-reply
function in relation to the wage of the union-ﬁrm pair i. Solving for the




4 − γ2 (5 − γ2)
2
(20)
where the apex B recalls that the equlibrium wage deﬁned by Eq. (20)
is obtained under Bertrand competition in the product market.
Finally, the sub-game perfect equilibrium quantity (after substitution of
Eq. (20) in Eq. (17)) and proﬁt (after substitution of Eq. (20) in Eq. (18))
under Bertrand competition are given by, respectively:
qi = qj = q
B =
α
2 + γ(1 − γ) +
p
4 − γ2 (5 − γ2)
(21)




2(1 − γ2) +
p




2 + γ(1 − γ) +
p
4 − γ2 (5 − γ2)
i2. (22)
3 Cournot-Bertrand proﬁt diﬀerential under
labour decreasing returns
In this section, we investigate if the conventional wisdom, according to which
Bertrand competition yields, in equilibrium, lower proﬁts with respect to
7Cournot competition, still holds in the presence of labour decreasing returns
and total wage bill (or, recalling that results do not qualitatively change,
rent) maximizing unions.
In particular, the Cournot-Bertrand proﬁt diﬀerential (based on the com-










γ(1 + γ) −
p
4 − γ2 (5 − γ2)
i
￿




2 + γ(1 − γ) +
p
4 − γ2 (5 − γ2)
i2 (23)
from which, the following result derives.
Result 1 In a context with labour decreasing returns (increasing quadratic
costs), total wage bill maximizing unions and (imperfect) substitutes goods,
proﬁts are greater under Bertrand than under Cournot competition if, and
only if, the degree of product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low. In particular,
we have that ∆π   0 ⇔ γ   0.732 ≡ γ.
Result 1 straightforwardly derives from the observation that the sign of
∆π only depends on the last term in squared brackets of the r.h.s.’s numer-
ator. In particular, we have that:
∆π   0 ⇔ γ(1 + γ)  
p
4 − γ2 (5 − γ2) (24)
which, solving last inequality for the γ’s values of interest, gives Result 1.
A graphical demonstration of Result 1 is provided in Figure 1, where the
behaviour of the Cournot-Bertrand proﬁt diﬀerential, according to the de-
gree of substitutability between goods (i.e. γ), is represented. In particular,
further than the case of interest in this paper (with “total wage bill” maxi-
mizing unions and labour decreasing returns), represented by the green solid
line, also two other useful benchmark cases are shown: the Cournot-Bertrand
proﬁt diﬀerential with total wage bill maximizing unions and labour constant
returns (dashed blue line)3 and that with exogenous (non union-bargained)
wages and labour decreasing returns (dotted red line).
3Notice that this case applies in CL&N when the unions’ relative bargaining power
β = 1, the weight unions place on the wage θ = 1
2 and the reservation wage w = 0.
In particular, the dashed blue line of Figure 1 plots CL&N’s Eq. (24) with β, θ and w
parameters setted as speciﬁed above.
8a
Figure 1: Cournot-Bertrand proﬁt diﬀerentials
aSolid green line: unionized wage and decreasing returns; dashed blue line: unionized
wage and constant returns; dotted red line: exogenous wage and decreasing returns. Pa-
rameters: α = 1, exogenous wage ω = 0.1. For graphical reasons, proﬁt diﬀerentials of
solid green and dashed blue lines have been multiplied by 100.
From the ﬁgure clearly emerges that, when unions are total wage bill
maximizing, the role they play in determining wages and the presence of
labour diminishing returns are both necessary to get the “reversal result”.
In particular, Figure 1 neatly illustrates that, when both those requirements
apply, it does exist a threshold value γ, which is invariant with respect to
the other economic parameters of the model, according to which proﬁts can
be lower, equal or higher with Bertrand competition according to γ ⋚ γ.
Instead, the behaviour of the dashed blue line conﬁrms, accordingly with
CL&N’s results, that, in the presence of constant marginal costs and total
wage bill maximizing unions, the weight the latter place on wages in their util-
ity functions is not suﬃciently high to get the reversal result. This, however,
no longer applies if we introduce labour decreasing returns into the analy-
sis. However, as graphically displayed by the dotted red line (and formally
shown in the Appendix), labour decreasing returns alone are not enough for
equilibrium proﬁts to be higher under Bertrand-type competition.4
4Also notice that, although the case of interest here has been restricted to substitutes
goods (i.e. γ > 0), from Figure 1 (partly) emerges that, if goods are complements (γ < 0),
the standard Singh and Vives’s (1984) result (see fn 1) applies, even with labour decreasing
returns. This conﬁrms also in this framework that, as emphasized by CL&N, the unionized
9Although a full understanding of this result deserves a more deep inves-
tigation, a ﬁrst tentative explanation can be provide making reference to the
CL&N’s results. In particular, CL&N establish that the possibility of the
reversal result rests on two facts: i) under Cournot competition unions bar-
gain a higher wage than under Bertrand competition, because an increase in
the wage rate determines a greater decrease in employment under the latter
than under the former and this reduces the unions’ incentives to settle for a
higher wage when facing a Bertrand-type competitor in the product market;
ii) equilibrium Cournot proﬁts are more sensitive to the level of bargained
wage than are Bertrand proﬁts. However, CL&N also stress that “[T]he force
of these arguments is strong enough to overturn the standard result – that
proﬁts are higher under Cournot – only if unions have suﬃcient inﬂuence
over wages and are suﬃciently wage-oriented. If unions do not exert a strong
inﬂuence over wages, then the standard result obtains” (CL&N, p. 692). In
our case, however, the presence of labour decreasing returns reinforces the
facts i) and ii), independently by the degree of unions’ wage-orientation. This
is because, when wages increase, ceteris paribus, the employment reduction
is more severe under decreasing returns. Furthermore, also strategic eﬀects,
which imply Cournot equlibrium proﬁts decrease more steeply in wages than
do Bertrand equilibrium proﬁts,5 are magniﬁed by the presence of diminish-
ing returns. This produces the reversal result notwithstanding that unions
are not distinctly wage-oriented.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated whether the conventional wisdom, accord-
ing to which (with imperfect substitutes goods) the equilibrium proﬁts under
Cournot competition are higher than under Bertrand competition, still holds
when there are decreasing returns to labour and wages are unilaterally ﬁxed
by a total wage bill (or rent) maximizing union.
It has been shown that the standard result may be reversed for a wide
range of the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Moreover, the presence of
labour decreasing returns tends to reinforce the mechanisms that contribute
to the reversal result, making this event possible for a wider range of situa-
oligopoly is not symmetric with respect to the eﬀects of product diﬀerentiation.
5See CL&N, p. 691.
10tions, with respect to those identiﬁed by the earlier literature.
Our result calls for further analyses that are deferred to future research.
In particular, while it holds true for the cases of rent and total wage bill
maximazing unions, extensions to other hypotheses concerning wage and
employment determination in the presence of unionization (i.e. “right-to-
manage” or eﬃcient bargaining) deserve to be considered. Furthermore, we
have not dealt with social welfare issues, which, nevertheless, may conduct
to important results. Indeed, while previous literature suggests that, even
when the Cournot-Bertrand proﬁt diﬀerential reversal result is possible, wel-
fare reversal never applies (Correa-L´ opez and Naylor, 2004), by introducing
the (stronger) eﬀects due to the presence of labour decreasing returns may
produce, in this direction, a diﬀerent outcome.
Appendix
Bertrand-Cournot proﬁt diﬀerentials with labour de-
creasing returns and exogenous wages
We show here that, when wages are exogenously given, hence, they do not
depend on diﬀerent types of product market competition, proﬁts are always
greater under Cournot than under Bertrand competition, even in the presence
of decreasing returns of labour.
Taking Eqs. (8) and (18) into account and exploiting the symmetry
hypothesis, we get that equilibrium proﬁts under Cournot-type and Bertrand-













α2(ω + 1 − γ2)
[(2(ω + 1) + γ(1 − γ)]
2 (A2)
where ω is the wage rate, which is assumed to be exogenous in this con-
text.




α2γ3 [γ(ω + 2) + 2(ω + 1)]
[(2(ω + 1) + γ]
2 [(2(ω + 1) + γ(1 − γ)]
2 > 0 (A3)
11for any γ > 0.
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